Morocco and the European Union: The economics of association by Visser, H.
VU Research Portal
Morocco and the European Union: The economics of association
Visser, H.
published in
Morocco and the Netherlands: Society, Economy, Culture
2006
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Visser, H. (2006). Morocco and the European Union: The economics of association. In P. Bos, & W. Fritschy
(Eds.), Morocco and the Netherlands: Society, Economy, Culture (pp. 91-101). VU University Press.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 27. May. 2021
r 'cc.
d the
eth rlan s
Society,Economy, Culture
Petra Bos and Wantje Fritschy(eds.)
v
VU University Press, Amsterdam
HansVisser
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Introduction
On 26 February 1996, Morocco and the European Union (hereafter referred to asthe EU) signed an Association Agreement. This association forms part of the Euro-
MediterraneanPartnership,which was established at Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995,
ata meeting between the EU and the majority of the non-European Mediterranean
countries.It is known in Euro-speak as the 'Barcelona Process'. The agreement, which
cameinto effect on 1 March 2000, should lead to the creation of a fTee-trade area by the
year2010.This will give Morocco fTeeaccess to EU markets, at least as far as industrial
produetsare concerned. The agreement also airns to achieve the progressive liberaliza-
rionof trade in agricultural and fishery products, but without any firm commitrnent by
thepartiesconcerned. It also requires Morocco and the EU to explore ways ofliberali-
zingtradein services,above and beyond their WTO (World Trade Organization) obli-
gations.
What benefits can Morocco expect fTom this association? In order to answer this
question,we will start with some background information on international trade theo-
ry,with an application to Morocco's trading situation. We will then proceed to discuss
theprocessof trade liberalization. This, in turn, is followed by an analysis of the problerns
associatedwith Morocco's economic integration with other countries. The next section
dealswith the costs and benefits deriving fTom the Association, and &om a higher degree
ofintegration in the world economy in general. From here we move on to examine the
preconditionsthat must be fulfilled if this integration is to be successful. The final secti-
ondrawsconclusions on the basis of the discussions and empirical data contained in the
precedingsections.
International trade
The positive effects of international trade can be said to derive fTom three sources.
Firstly,specialization dictated by comparative advantage. If countries, like individuals,
specializein those activities at which they excel, or are most efficient, then production
andincome will be maxirnized. This is explained by the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin
models,which form the core of international trade theory.l Secondly, economies of
scale.Free trade provides opportunities for large-scale production, as well as the chance
to exploit the economies of large-scale production, i.e., to reduce the production and
marketingcasts per product unit. Thirdly, competition effects. When borders are open-
1 See, for instanee, Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) 26, 50, 76.
91
ed, competition increases. This means that firms will have to constantly improve the
goods and services they produce, to prevent their customers from shilling their allegian-
ce. The same applies to these companies' production technology and marketing methocls.
In view of these benefits, why is there no free trade on a global scale? There are basi-
cally three reasons for this. Firstly, trade affects the distribution of income. If we liberali-
ze trade and import more goods produced using unskilled labour, while at the same time
exporting more goods produced with highly skilled labour, this will have several effects.
The demand for poorly-skilled labour falls, the demand for highly-skilled labour incre-
ases, and the wage gap between the two will widen. This may then result in attempts by
trade uni ons to prevent trade liberalization.
Secondly, when a country liberalizes trade, industries competing with the imported
goods will suffer. This will cause some firrns and industries to contract, while others may
even disappear completely. People will have to be retrained. There rnay be an anxiety that
new jobs are not being created fast enough to compensate for the disappearance of the
old ones. Again, those affected will resist liberalization. A very curious case of resistance
against freer imports occurred in the mid-1990s, when tomatoes from Morocco were
granted freer entry into the EU. Fully aware that this would impinge on their profit mar-
gins, tomato growers in the EU conducted a successfullobbying campaign in Brussels.
It was subsequently ruled that, in the month of April, the door would be closed to
Moroccan tomatoes2. The reason for this was that, in April, EU tomato production is low
and prices are high. The ban on Moroccan tomatoes enabled EU tomato growers to flee-
ce the consumer in times of scarcity.
Thirdly, trade restrictions in the form of import tarifIS also serve an entirely different
purpose, the generation of tax revenue. The perception costs of import tariffs are likely
to be substantially lower than those associated with income tax or a turn over tax. Paar
countries in particular, including Morocco in the early 1980s, often derive some thirty
per cent of their total tax income from import tarifIS.3
There is no question that international trade is essential to Morocco's welfare. It has a
comparative advantage in phosphates, a number of agricultural products, and the simpIer
kinds of industrial processes, such as garment manufacture and electronics assembly.
Morocco's export revenue derives rnain1y from these products and activities (see Table
1). It is better to specialize in these areas and import those industrial products that requi-
re highly skilled labour and a large amount of capital and/ or are dependent on high
volumes for efficient production. A case in point is truck assembly. In the year 2000,
some two thousand trucks were assembIed in Morocco by no less than nine producers.
This is a waste of resources.4
It serves as a reminder that Morocco is a relatively small market. In 2003, Morocco
had 30.6 million inhabitants and its gross domestic product or GDP amounted to €39
billion (bn). By comparison, the Netherlands had 16.2 million inhabitants and a GDP of
2 Trouw (1995).
3 Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999).
4 WTO (2003) 85.
$454bn. For most industries, the domestic market is simply too small for them to be
ableto exploit economies of scale. Trade liberalization is of the essence. Products which
are expensive to produce in Morocco should be imported. This will tree up production
factors that can be used to better advantage in the export industries.
Tahle 1.Morocco,percentage share of commodityexports,1995 and 2002
textiles
agriculture
electronics
fertilizer(phosphates)
SOUTee:Söderling (2005).
The EU is the country's natural partner when it comes to international trade. In 2003,
the EU accounted for no less than 71% of Morocco's exports and 58% of its imports.5
lt is a sad fact that the EU has not allowed Morocco to fully exploit its comparative
advantage. Under the Association Agreement, industrial imports trom Morocco have
unrestricted entry into the EU, but there has been little progress on trade in agricultu-
ral goods. The trade agreement of October 2003 imposed tariff quotas on a number of
products, such as tomatoes. This means that imports carry a low tariff, possibly even a
zero tariff, up to a certain volume. Additional imports are subject to a higher tariff.
Such agreements are only concluded for short periods. This uncertainty does little to
stimulate investment. A fisheries agreement, for example, which was due to take effect
on 1 March 2006, is only valid for a period of four years. The agreement regulates the
activities of EU fishing fleets - mainly Spanish and Portuguese - in Moroccan waters. It
contains detailed stipulations regarding the percentage of the catch that has to be unlo-
adedon Moroccan soil. This was in response to Moroccan demands, which were aimed
at boosting employment and tax income. In addition, it was hoped that the measure
would stimulate the development oflocal fish processing industries.6 However, it remains
to be seen whether or not people will be willing to make substantial investments on the
basisof an agreement with a lifetime of just four years. As for services, prior to 2005 the
EU had not even started to think seriously about discussing the subject.
5 European Cornrnission (2005). Trade statistics should be taken with a grain of salt. Exports of
goods fiom Morocco officially totalled €8230 million over 2003, European Cornrnission (2005),
but illegal drugs exports are estimated to have brought in no less than €3 billion, Bergh (2005) 9.
6 L'économiste(17 July 2005, 23 December 2005).
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1tade liberalization
The import of Moroccan industrial products into the EU had already been liberalized
before the 2000 Association Agreement was concluded. So one might weIl ask 'What is
in it for Morocco?' Mter all, Morocco will bear the brunt of the necessary adjustments.
It is under an obligation to liberalize its imports, especially those involving industrial
products. Nevertheless, countries generally benefit considerably fiom import liberaliza-
tion. In the past, Morocco has used quite high rates of protection. According to 2002
figures fiom the World Bank, the weighted mean import tariff in Morocco was 25.8 %,
against 1.80% for the EU. If anything, this still paints a too favourable picture.7 Some
goods are subject to prohibitively high tariffs. The maximum rate was a whopping
339%.8 As aresult, the goods that fall under this tariff scarcely figure among the coun-
try's imports. This means that they are not included in the weighted average, which is
therefore subject to a downward bias. Such high levels of protection are detrimental to
a country's welfare. They enable inefficient industries to survive. This in its turn makes
life harder for industries operating in those areas in which a country has a comparative
advantage.
Three mechanisms are involved. The first derives fiom the fact that protection results
in reduced demand for foreign goods, which in turn causes a reduction in the demand
for foreign exchange. Accordingly, the external value of the country's currency will be
higher than it would have been under fiee trade conditions, which means that exports
suffer. Secondly, more labour and capital remain tied up in the protected sectors, which
translates into higher labour and capital costs in the other sectors. Thirdly, potential
exporters see their competitiveness impaired by the higher cost (or sheer unavailability)
of imported inputs. In the case of Morocco, agricultural exporters have suffered fiom the
high prices of such imports as tractors and seeds, which are a direct result of import
duties. As a result, a large number of industries have seen their growth reduced by the
unavailability of inputs. 9
In Morocco, things are made even more complicated by the enormous variation in
import tariffs. This leads to a completely opaque structure of effective protection.
Effective protection differs fiom nominal protection (import tariffs on goods), in that it
refers to the protection of domestic activities, taking account of tariffi on imported raw
materials or semi-finished products. Consider the case of carpenters involved in the
manufacture of tables. The amount of timber required to make one table costs $100 on
world markets, whereas complete tables cost $200 on world markets. If timber is subject
to a 5% import tariff and complete tables are charged 10%, then the domestic price of
the imported timber is $105 and the domestic price of an imported table is $220. The
work oftransforming the timber into a table can cost up to $115 before domestic car-
penters lose the fight against imports. This means that the effective protection on
domestic activity is 15%, which is higher than the nominal tariff on tables. However, if
7 EconomieReviewof EU MediterraneanPartners(2003) 7.
8 WTO (2003) Statistica! Appendix Table AIII.3.
9 Bergh (2005) 8.
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timber is subject to a 15% tariff, for example, while tables only carry a 5% tariff, the result
is negative effective protection. Imported timber will cost $115, while imported tables
cast$210. Domestic carpenters will therefore be handicapped, since they can charge no
more than $95, which is $5 less than their colleagues abroad receive.
It may very well be that activities in areas where Morocco enjoys a comparative advan-
tagecannot prosper because of adverse effective protection. According to the WTO and
the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the existing tariff stmcture stacks the odds
againstindustries producing semi-finished products, in which Morocco is said to have a
comparative advantage10. However, it might be more accurate to say that Morocco has a
comparative advantage in the area of re1ative1y simple industrial processes. In the textile
industry, for instance, there is considerable outsourcing and/ or intra-firm trade by
Spanishand British firms. This means that there are substantial imports of intermediate
goods trom Spain and Britain, and that the finished goods are exported to these same
cauntries.The export of finished textile products to the UK and Spain increased 18-fold
and 26-fold respective1y, in nominal terms, between 1995 and 2002.11
Morocco will undoubtedly benefit trom the phasing out of import tariffs on industri-
al goods. However, the sequencing of this process will involve adverse side effects. This
isbecause the tariffs for final products - an area in which Morocco has no comparative
advantage,at least not for sophisticated goods -, will be the last to go. As a result, these
produets will continue to receive protection while others do not, which will give false
signalsto producers.
While the effects of import liberalization are generally beneficial, as we have seen,
there may be a cost in terms of tax income foregone. In the year 2000, import tariffs
accounted for 4.8 % of GDp, or 17.9 % of government income.12 If import tariffs are to
be drastically reduced, then Morocco needs to find other sources of tax revenue. The
problem appears to be manageable, however. Since 1988, increases in the amount ofVAT
(ValueAdded Tax) collected on imported goods at the country's borders seem to have
matched the reduction in import tariffs, thanks large1y to increased international trade.13
Problems of economieintegration
The phasing out of import tariffs is not the only measure that will help Morocco impro-
veitseconomic performance. The country is also adopting a large part of the EU acquis
communautaire14in fields such as intellectual property, competition policy and govern-
ment subsidies. This will impose a temporary, but neverthe1ess heavy, administrative bur-
den. However, it will also make for a more efficient economy, in which clear mIes are
observed. It will, furthermore, reduce the risk of Morocco becoming involved in trade
disputeswith other countries as aresult of 'unfair' trade practices. Even with these mea-
lOWTO (2003).
11 Söderling (2005).
12 IMF (2003) 18.
13 Bergh (2005) 8 nt. 17.
14The body of EU legislation and regulations.
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sures, however, the risk of such disputes cannot be completely excluded. Aside trom its
tree trade agreement with the EU, Morocco has entered into a similar agreement with
EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, which is made up of Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Switzerland.The country opened other avenues to tree trade in 2004, when
it signed the Agadir Agreement together with Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. In that same
year, Morocco also concluded bilateral tree-trade agreements with Turkey and with the
United States. The latter deal, which is to be implemented in the period trom 2006 to
2021, is particularly likely to result in all kinds of complications.
Consider the following case. Under their bilateral tree-trade agreement, Morocco
imports certain goods trom the US, tree of duty. However, these same American goods
are subject to an import tariff when they enter the EU In this situation, traders would
be tempted to import the goods into Morocco tree of duty, and then to re-export them
to the EU This phenomenon is referred to as diflectionif trade,and such imports arenot
welcomed by the EU The EU therefore requires certificatesif origin, stating that at least
some minimum percentage of the added value of the goods in question originates &om.
Morocco. The US naturally operates a similar scheme. Aside trom being extremely
expensive in terms of the administrative burdens that they impose, these measures open
the way to cormption and may also sour relations with trade partners. People will
always try to cheat.iS In fact, the mIes of origin included in the various tree trade agree-
ments concluded by Morocco are very diverse. This is not helped by the complex struc-
ture of import tariffs. The World Bank and the IMF have put pressure on the Moroccan
government to harmonize and simplifY the system.16
There is one bright spot, however. The EU wants to stimulate trade between the
Mediterranean countries and to counteract the hub-and-spoke effects that have charac-
terized trade ever since French colonial rule.17 It therefore allows what is referred to as
the cumulation of certiflcates of origin. This means that the minimum requirements per-
taining to the sources of added value include value added in other Mediterranean COUll-
tries, a rule which applies to the Agadir Agreement, for instance. While this is undoub-
tedly a step in the right direction, in itself it is not sufiicient to bring about an intensi-
flcation of trade between the Mediterranean countries. Morocco and its neighbours
could do much more in this respect. In the year 2000, four neighbouring countries pro-
vided no more than 2.5% ofMorocco's imports and took a measly 1.9% ofits exports.18
More regionalliberalization and integration would create opportunities to exploit the
economies of scale. Such steps would also make the region more attractive for direct
foreign investment, which would help to introduce better technology, management and
marketing. Between them, the three Maghreb countries of Algeria, Tunesia and Morocco
15 More on the problems associated with fiee-trade areas and the points of difference with
customs unions in Visser (2004).
16 L'économiste (13 December 2005), IMF (2005a) 15.
17 This refers to the fact that there has been very litde trade between the Maghreb countries;
most trade has been with France, which is seen here as the centre or hub.
18 WTO (2003) 22.
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have more than 75 million inhabitants. The importance of this fact is that there is solid
evidence that larger regional economic areas tend to attract more direct foreign invest-
ment. 19
Cooperation beween the Maghreb countries was slow to take off, but it seems to be
gathering pace at last. A conference on trade facilitation in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
was held in Algiers on November 21-22, 2005. Those attending induded ministers, the
presidents of various central banks, and the managing director of the IME Working
groups were set up to formulate proposals on issues relating to doser regional econom-
ic cooperation. One such issue concerns the harmonization of trade regulations linked
to the implementation of ITee trade agreements, with particular reference to procedures
and rules of origin. Other issues are the modernization of adrninistrative procedures
within the custorns service, the streamlining of document processing, the improvement
of cross-border payment systems, and a review oflogistical chains, induding transporta-
tion. Dates have been fixed for follow-up meetings and there seems to be a fair chance
that the respective governments will keep up the momentum, perhaps with some prod-
ding ttom the IMF and the World Bank.
What can be expected fiom trade liberalization?
Full-scale model estimates of the benefi.ts of economic association with the EU are few
and far between. An idea of the quantities involved can be gleaned ttom a World Bank
study ofTunisia, which is also involved in the Barcelona Process.20 The static reallocation
effects of association with the EU were estimated to permanently increase GDP by 1.7
per cent. These effects derive ttom the reallocation of economic resources to bring them
more into line with the country's comparative advantage. In addition, there are dynamic
effects,resulting ttom economies of scale and ttom the effects ofharmonizing health and
technical regulations that were forced upon Tunisia by the European Union. Another
factor is the increased trading efficiency brought about by improved financial, telecom-
munication and transport facilities, which were upgraded with EU assistance. The gains
for Morocco are likely to be of the same order of magnitude, with the static gains in one
study estimated to be in the range of 1.5 - 2 per cent.21 It should be noted that the
effects may turn out to be much larger in reality. This is because the World Bank study
did not address the effects of increased competition ttom abroad, such as the adoption
of best practices, improved technologies, and better marketing techniques ITom other
countries.
It will take time to reallocate resources between the various branches ofindustry. Nor
can it be assumed that this process will be entirely cost-ttee, in terms of ttictional unem-
ployment. Rutherford et al. expected that it would take a fuil five years before any sta-
tic reallocation effects become visible.22When labour and capital have to move ITom one
19 Jaumotte (2004).
20 Rutherford et al. (1995).
21 Rutherford et al. (1993).
22 Rurherford et al. (1993).
97
industry to another, the expansion of new industries may very weIl lag behind the
contraction of old ones. Firstly, businessmen have to exploit new opportunities created
by trade liberalization and secondly, part of the labour force will have to be retrained.
Rutherford et al. estimated that the cost of such retraining was roughly equivalent to one
year's salary.
The reallocation of labour rnay be especially difficult in poor agricultural districts.
Vnder the fiee trade agreement with the Vnited States, import tariffs on cereals, which
run at up to 100 per cent, are to be phased out. It has to be said that cereal production
in Morocco is not very efficient. It takes up scarce resources, water in particular, that
would give higher yields if channeIled into the production of other goods. Nevertheless,
the World Bank has expressed concern that duty-fiee imports of cereals fiom the United
States will only serve to exacerbate rural poverty. The Moroccan government has been
singularly slow in preparing support measures for those affected.23
These costs must be balanced against the additional benefits that can be expected trom
trade liberalization, over and above the efficiency gains fiom production which exploits
the country's comparative advantage. These benefits accrue fiom the possible reduction
of'rent-seeking activities', which would fiee up resources for more productive activities.
What are 'rent-seeking activities'? In a system of regulated trade, politicians and civil ser-
vants have discretionary power over the granting of import permits and tariff exemp-
tions. Import licenses and exemptions are important sources of income. Import restric-
tions reduce the supply of goods, which means that higher prices can be charged. If the
reduction of supply is brought about by a licensing system rather than import duties,
there will be a large gap between the prices paid by importers and the prices they cau
charge on the domestic market. They will receive a much higher price than is required
for them to stay in the market, in other words, they earn a 'rent'. The same applies to
exemptions fiom import duties, of course. Licenses and exemptions have a monetary
value, so importers will devote time and other resources trying to secure them. From the
point of view of society as a whole, such 'rent-seeking activities' are extremely wasteful.
Moreover, they easily re sult in shady dealings. Politicians and civil servants grant permits
and exemptions, then pocket a share of the 'rents' created by the import restrietions as
payment. Even if they can withstand the temptation to accept abribe, their controIover
import restrictions gives them considerable power. Such power is seldom used to allo-
cate licenses in an equitable and efficient way. There tends to be a coterie of politicians,
civil servants and leading traders, to which small businessmen have no access.
Furthermore, the whole system is detrimental to efficiency. Entrepreneurs are compel-
led to divert time and energy into maintaining good contacts with the state bureaucra-
cy, to the detriment of innovative activity.
23 L'économiste (25 January 2005).
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Additionalrequirementsfor success
Internationaltrade theory is unclear about whether trade should be seen as an engine of
growthor as nothing more than its handmaiden.24 Perhaps this question will never be
satisfactorilyanswered. This is because, in the peculiarly un-erotic universe of the meta-
phorsthat make up a large part of economic theory, it is difficult to distinguish 'hand-
maidens'from 'engines'. But even assuming that trade is an engine, it would only run in
fitsand starts unless a number of conditions are fulfilled.
Firstof all, while Morocco has concluded various free trade agreements, this does not
necessarilymean that trade is genuinely ttee. Trade in manufactured goods with the EU
mayindeed leave less room for the restrictions that create 'rents'. Nevertheless, there are
stillplenty of opportunities to irnpose such restrictions in trade with other countries, and
inagricultural trade. Not only does this hinder trade, it also imp edes the development
ofindustriesthat are able to compete on world markets.
Furthermore, trade liberalization must be accompanied by similar liberalization on the
domesticfront, to bring about an efficient allocation of resources. More importantly still,
thiswill allow talented individuals to give fu1l rein to their entrepreneurial abilities.
Domesticliberalization includes a reduction of the costs of doing business, mainly by
doingaway with red tape. It may also include the privatization of government enterpri-
ses.Unfortunately, this does not always help to create the sort of competitive environ-
mentin which entrepreneurs are constantly introducing innovations: new products, new
productionmethods, new markets, new sources of supply of raw materials or semi-finis-
hedgoods,or the re-structuring of an industry. Such Schumpeterian 'new combinations'
areessentialto ongoing economic development.25 It is all too easy, and unfortunately all
tooconnnon, for governments to sell assets cheaply to favoured buyers. During the late
1980s,some thirty large families with close ties to the royal palace in Morocco seem to
haveprofitedin this way.26This favours the development of oligopolies, in which indi-
vidualfirms are left in peace in their cosy corner of the market. They have little incen-
tiveto innovateand create new jobs. There are signs,however, that the privatization that
'hastaken place in recent years has been more successful. In addition, foreign investors
aretaking up a large proportion of the assets put up for sale.27
~Furthermore, there is the question of education. According to World Bank figures, in
2002illiteracy rates in individuals above the age of 14 were 37% for males and 62%
arnongfemales.28Moreover, the emphasis on Arabic, coupled with a neglect of French
andother foreign languages, means that education is not well geared to the needs of a
developingeconomy. Nor does it help that there are no less than four different ministries
ofeducation.
24 Linnemann (1996).
25 Schumpeter (1969) 66.
26 Bergh (2005) 9.
27 Bergh (2005) 9 nt. 21.
28 www.worldbank.org->Morocco->dataprofile
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There are other requirements for faster economic development and job creation;
which we can only mention in passing here. One is a sophisticated financial systemthat
is subject to clear mIes and efllcient supervision.A further cause for concern is the lirni-
ted availability and high cost of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises.29An effi-
cient, low-cost transport inttastructure is also essential for economic growth, yet the
charges levied for the use of Moroccan ports are outrageously high.30 Things are likely
to improve, however, as the Tanger-Med (Tanger-Méditerranée) port complex, whieh.
wiil be accessible to ships carrying up to 2000 containers, is nearing completion.
Final observations
There is every reason to believe that Morocco will benefit ttom the Association
Agreement, but not to the fuil extent possible. The EU should liberalize imports of agri-
cultural products and, for its part, Morocco could do more to stimulate trade with its
neighbours. Furthermore, the country can only fuUy profit ttom liberalization if
domestic markets are also opened up, and if entrepreneurs are not hindered by excessi-
ve red tape. In addition, educationallevels are too low for Morocco to profit fully fiom
the opportunities provided by more openness. While the liberalization of trade helpsto
fight poverty, it is by no means a panacea. This is a vital first step, nothing more.
When compared to developing countries as a whole (see Table 2) and to its neighbour
Tunisia in particular, Morocco's economic growth to date has been quite lack-lustre.31
Table 2. GDP Growth, 1971-2004 (in percent)
Souree:Morocco:SelectedIssues,IMF Country Report No. 05/419,p. 6; based on Moroaan
National Accounts; MlEO database;and IMF Stqff estimates.The group of developingcountries
encompasses 152 nations.
29 IMP (2005a) 16.
30 L'économiste(13 December 2005). Por a more comprehensive review of recent
developments see 10 YearsofBarce/onaprocess(2005).
31 IMP (2005b) 6.
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Real GDP growth Real GDP per-capita growth
Morocco Developing Morocco Developing
countries countries
1971-2004 3.81 4.47 1.75 2.58
1971-1982 4.75 0.74 0.09 2.58
1982-1991 4.32 3.75 2.16 1.80
1991-1998 2.11 4.20 0.42 2.51
1998-2004 3.33 5.35 2.05 3.84
Althoughbadlyaffected by a series of droughts in the 1990s, growth has now picked up
again.It is difficult to say how much of the increase in growth is due to the impact of
theAssociationAgreement with the EU. However, econometric studies have revealed a
positiverelationship between Morocco's increased openness in trade and its economic
growth.32Theofficial unemployment figures have dropped steadily fiom 14.5 per cent
in1999to an estimated 10.8 per cent in 2004. However, the latter figure disguises the
factthaturban unemployment stood at 18.4 per cent in 2004.33 There is still a long way
togoand one can only hope that the groundwork for sustained growth has been laid.
32 IMF (200Sb) 27. Trade openness is the ratio of this volume of trade (rea! exports plus imports)
overGDp, adjusted for the size (area and population) of the country, per capita GDp, whether it
is landlocked, and whether it is an oil exporter.
33 IMF (200Sb) 62.
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